Lowe had a reputation as a workhorse; he had no significant injuries to his name since his 1997 arrival in Boston. As both starter and reliever, Lowe took the ball whenever asked and threw sinker after sinker until he punched his time-card. The Braves wanted consistency from Lowe, and when he lowered his asking price in the 2009 offseason (Lowe initially sought an absurd five-year, $80 million deal), Frank Wren pulled the trigger.
Braves fans never expected big things out of Lowe, and never got them. For three years he plied his trade. The highs came at the end of the 2010 season, when a red-hot Lowe put up some of the best numbers in baseball (a 1.17 ERA in five September starts) as the Braves eked into the playoffs. The lows came a year later, with an 8.75 ERA in his five September starts, as the Braves collapsed out of the postseason.
Fredi Gonzalez had no business allowing Lowe to start those last two September games; Lowe had been sub-par all season and word had already leaked that Lowe would be traded during the offseason, giving no incentive for veteran respect or confidence building. Arguments that Gonzalez was alleviating pressure or limiting the workloads on the team's young prospects were rendered moot when Fredi pitched them all in high-pressure innings anyway. Why not start Julio Teheran with Lowe as the long-relief option? Lowe was a given loss at that point. Alas, Lowe took the ball and more poundings, and the Cardinals took the Wild Card.
Atlanta will now pay Lowe $10 million not to pitch for them, receiving Chris Jones in exchange. Jones, a 22-year-old lefty, is a middling prospect; a 15th-round pick with 15th-round pick results so far. Drafted as a starter, he's been converted to the bullpen where he's flashed good strikeout numbers and walked a few too many batters. In four minor league seasons he has not yet made out of high-A ball, and has not shown much improvement. His ceiling might be as a LOOGY, but really, anything the pro club gets out of Jones would be icing, the key here for Wren was getting Lowe off the team to free up what money he could and open up a spot in a crowded rotation. Entering next season, Hudson, Hanson, Jurrjens and Beachy appear to be locks, while top prospects Mike Minor, Julio Teheran, Arodys Vizcaino and Randall Delgado battle out for the final spot and injury fill-ins. The smart money is on the more experienced Minor, allowing the younger three to return to to the minors for more conditioning. Tommy John returnee Kris Medlen is a wild card; Medlen looked as strong in his late-season bullpen work as he had in his starts before the injury in 2010.
Regardless of the replacement, the team couldn't afford to pay $15 million for a guy who didn't fit the plan, and didn't want to risk the chemistry dissolution were Lowe relegated to bullpen work. And so they sent Lowe shipping, eating the sunk cost, getting back a bit of money and taking a flier on a young arm. The move has a sense of inevitability to it; it's been in the making since the moment the team willingly overpaid for an aging arm with a strong past pedigree but deceptive recent returns. With the exception of a brief September '10 hot streak, nothing over the past three years has done anything but strengthen the inevitably of Lowe becoming an albatross in 2012. It's hard to fault Lowe, who took the money and did what he could to earn it; it wasn't his fault the team overpaid, and it wasn't his fault that Fredi didn't bench him. We can wish him well and be glad he's gone at the same time. Consider it a $10 million lesson in sabermetrics, and a suddenly free cash-flow for a decent position player. If the Braves spend wisely, and luck into one of the bargain bats that are seemingly always out there, the trade could reap much deeper dividends.
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